Currently, the popularity of the Internet of Things (IoT) has brought about an increase in the amount of data, so multi-server distributed cloud computing has been widely used in various applications that have brought convenience to our daily lives. At the same time, the development of the fifth generation (5G) of mobile communication technology has gradually become the main driving force for the popularization of the IoT. Because the 5G network is a heterogeneous network with multiple servers and small cells, the mutual authentication protocol under multiple servers is also applicable to the 5G network environment. However, much of the data will have serious storage and security issues during transmission. Aiming at the security issues in a multi-server (M-S) architecture, in 2018, Wu et al. proposed an authentication protocol in a distributed cloud environment. They claimed that their protocol is secure and resistant to various known types of attacks. However, we found that their protocol does not guarantee perfect forward secrecy (PFS) and suffers from privileged insider (PI) attacks. Such attacks will cause data to be out of sync. Therefore, we improved Wu et al.'s protocol and proposed an improvement in the 5G network environment. Finally, we performed a security analysis on the proposed protocol, including the automatic encryption protocol tool ProVerif, BAN logic, and informal security analysis, which proved that our protocol is secure. Compared with similar existing schemes, we have proved the efficiency of the scheme and achieved higher security standards.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, the development of fifth generation (5G) technology has increasingly attracted researchers' interest. The development of 5G technology has become the main driving force for the growth of Internet-of-Things (IoT) related applications [1] . Future IoT applications will require new performance standards in areas such as security [2] - [8] , big dada [9] , [10] , reliability, low latency, artificial intelligence [11] - [13] , and wireless network coverage [14] - [16] , which are applicable to many IoT devices. Additionally, 5G has higher energy efficiency requirements in these aspects than 4G, so many current single-server structures are not The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Isaac Woungang. suitable for 5G networks. Then some scholars proposed the use of a multi-server architecture in a 5G network environment [17] , [18] . The IoT connects objects all over the world to the Internet, such as in the military field, intelligent transportation, and smart homes. During the use of these objects, sensors installed on these objects collect data and transmit the data to other smart devices. People can get the data they need through certain devices. Therefore, the use of the IoT brings large amounts of data to people, and we must face how to protect the data. To solve this problem, cloud computing technology was introduced as a key technology for storing data on distributed cloud servers instead of local hosts. This technology introduces a control server that can control multiple private cloud services, and these private cloud servers are organized in a distributed manner (see Fig. 1 ). Cloud computing is the storage and management of data. Today, cloud computing technology is relatively mature and widely used. In the multi-server architecture of a 5G network, the authentication process involves three entities. The first is users, who support mmWave technology and device-todevice technology and can use these technologies to access the server. The smart devices they use contain smart cards issued by the control server and private data accumulated by sensors. These smart devices have limited computing power. The second is a cloud server that can communicate with and provide services to users. There are many cloud servers in the entire system. The last one is the control server, which stores registration information for users and cloud servers to help both authenticate and generate session keys.
However, the IoT environment is fragile and vulnerable to unforeseen circumstances such as unexpected power outages and network disruptions. Much of the information transmitted in the IoT network is private and sensitive. How we ensure the security of this type of data is critical. In response to this problem, researchers have proposed numerous authentication schemes. Considering the computing power and service life of IoT devices, it is reasonable to design some low-energy and lightweight authentication protocols.
Because many IoT devices have limited computing and storage capabilities, we propose a secure, lightweight authentication scheme for distributed cloud computing environments that uses only hash functions and XOR operations. Authentication takes place between remote objects during communication. Lamport [19] first proposed an authentication mechanism using password over insecure networks in 1981. However, this protocol has some security problems, such as dependence on password tables, and high hash overhead. Later, researchers presented various improvements to the security issues that emerged in Lamport et al.'s protocol. Some of the early improvements [20] - [22] to the authentication scheme were to fix the vulnerabilities in [19] . Later, to improve the security of remote communication, researchers used other security factors based on traditional passwords. In 2001, Chang and Wu [23] and Hwang et al. [24] introduced smart card solutions. A series of smart-card-based authentication schemes were subsequently proposed [25] - [28] . Li et al. [29] first proposed using the neural network schemes for identity authentication in a M-S environment. Later, due to the inefficiency and insecurity of the Li et al. scheme, many researchers have made improvements to the authentication method [30] - [32] . Additionally, some protocols have begun to use biometrics to ensure security [33] .
Because 5G networks are heterogeneous, users will have frequent authentication to prevent the various attacks. In addition, due to the limitation of computing resources in IoT systems, more efficient authentication and key exchange protocols need to be developed for complex M-S 5G networks [34] . M-S authentication protocols have been widely proposed in [35] - [43] . Recently, Wu et al. [44] proposed an authentication protocol for a distributed cloud environment. Their protocol is claimed to resist off-line password guessing (OPG) attacks, PI attacks, desynchronization attacks, forgery attacks, and user tracking attacks. In Wu et al.'s paper, it was mentioned that the protocols of Irshad et al. [43] and Amin et al. [45] had security issues. Irshad et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to PI attacks and cannot guarantee user anonymity (UA). Amin et al.'s protocol does not guarantee UA and is subject to OPG attacks.
The above discussion shows that designing the AKE protocol for a distributed cloud computing network to meet security requirements is a serious task. All existing solutions are neither resistant to all known attacks, nor can they guarantee the consumption of their own calculations. In this paper, we concentrate on analyzing the security of [44] and point out that their protocol fails to resist stolen smart card (SSC) attacks and PI attacks, and cannot provide pre-verification and perfect forward secrecy (PFS). To overcome the limitations, we propose an enhanced protocol based on the Wu et al.'s protocol for the multi-server architecture in the 5G IoT environment. In addition, we prove that the protocol provides a variety of security functions, including PFS and resistance to privileged internal attacks, stolen smart card attacks, etc. We use the ProVerif tool, BAN (Burrows-Abadi-Needham) logic, and informal security analysis to prove the security. Finally, we provide comparisons of various related schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly introduce the scheme of Wu et al. Cryptanalysis of the same scheme is given in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the details of the proposed protocol. Section 5 is mainly a discussion of ProVerif, BAN logic analysis, and informal security analysis. Security and performance comparisons are given in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we give the conclusion of this article. 
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF WU et al's PROTOCOL A. REVIEW OF WU et al.'s PROTOCOL
In the section, we briefly introduce Wu et al.'s protocol [44] . Their protocol consists of user and server registration, authentication, and password change phases. It requires the use of secure channels in the registration phases and public channels in the second and third phases. Data transmitted over a public channel can be stolen, forged, or modified. In their protocol, there exist three roles: user U i , cloud server S j , and control server CS. The notation used in this paper is presented in Table 1 . Because the security analysis does not involve the password update phase, our review of Wu et al. consists of only the registration and the authentication phases.
1) REGISTRATION
U i registers with CS by executing the following steps: 1) U i selects ID i , PW i , and b i to compute HP i = h(PW i b i ). Then, it sends ID i and HP i to CS over the secure channel. 2) CS generates a pseudo-identity PID i for U i and computes D 1 , D 2 . Then CS stores (PID i , D 1 , D 2 ) into a smart card (SC) and sends the SC to U i , where x is CS's secret key, ID SC is an identity of the smart card, and D 1 = h(PID i x)⊕H (ID i HP i ), D 2 = h(ID i ID SC )⊕HP i . 3) After receiving the SC, U i computes D 3 = b i ⊕h (ID i b i ) and stores it into the smart card. S j registers with CS by executing the following steps: 1) S j selects its identity SID j and sends it to CS. Then, CS stores SID j and generates a pseudo identity PSID j for S j . 2) Finally, CS sends (PSID j , C 1 ) to S j via a secure channel, where C 1 = h(PSID j x). 3) On receiving the message from CS, S j stores this message into its database.
2) AUTHENTICATION
When user U i wants to access the service of some cloud server S j , CS can help to establish a session key for communication. The detailed procedures are described as follows. 1) User U i inputs ID i and PW i and computes b i = D 3 ⊕h(ID i PW i ) and HP i = h(PW i b i ). Then, U i selects a random value N i , SID j to compute
If the verifications do not hold, U i terminates.
B. CRYPTANALYSIS OF WU et al.'s PROTOCOL
This section discusses the cryptanalysis of Wu et al.'s protocol. We analyze the security and design flaws, which is described in the following subsections.
1) PERFECT FORWARD SECRECY (PFS)
In this section, we demonstrate that Wu et al.'s protocol did not provide PFS, an important security requirement in authenticated key agreement protocols, under some assumptions.
Assume that adversary A can obtain {D 1 , D 2 , D 3 }, the information of U i 's SC and CS's secret key x. Meanwhile, A can capture messages PID i , PSID j , B 2 , B 3 , . . . , B 16 for each session in which U i wants to access the service of S j . The established session SK can be derived by A according to the following steps:
2) PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACKS
Assume that there is a malicious U i who tries to convince CS that S j is willing to communicate with him. U i keeps two sets of {D 1 , PID i }, namely D 1 , PID i and D 1 , PID i , when running two logins with other S j . U i now prepares his message M 1 faithfully using the old method. Then, this malicious U i will create the message PSID j , B 6 , B 7 , B 8 as follows:
• This U i selects a random number N j and a timestamp T j .
. The malicious user sends the above-computed message along with M 1 to the CS. The latter will accept the authentication. The user and the CS can complete mutual authentication (MA) and compute the session key. Some values will be updated by Wu et al.'s protocol after completion of the authentication.
After the malicious user and the CS complete the authentication, the related information stored in the CS and the S may be inconsistent, and then the legitimate server cannot communicate normally. The details are as follows.
The CS generates N c , PID new i , PSID new j and performs the same computations as the authentication phase above (computes {B 9 − B 11 , SK c , B 12 − B 14 , B 16 }). Then CS sends M 3 = {B 9 , B 10 , . . . , B 16 } to S j . The malicious user intercepts the message and then computes a new virtual identity. After such computations are completed, the virtual identity stored by the legitimate server is not the same as that stored in the control server. This causes data desynchronization, and in subsequent communications, the cloud server will be treated as an illegal individual.
3) PRE-VERIFICATION IN SMART CARDS
In general, users will log in to the smart card before performing authentication. That is, when the user enters ID and PW , the SC can verify them whether correct. However, Wu et al. did not provide such a process. In Wu et al.'s protocol, the user inputs ID and PW , and because the smart card does not have a corresponding verification value, the smart card cannot perform any verification on the user's PW and ID.
III. ENHANCED PROTOCOL BASED ON WU et al.'s PROTOCOL
In this section, we present the details of the proposed protocol. Our protocol can resolve the above security problems. There exist three roles: user U i , cloud server S j , and control server CS.
A. USER AND CLOUD SERVER REGISTRATION PHASE
The user registers with CS by executing the following steps. Fig. 2 demonstrates the user registration phase of the enhanced protocol.
1) U i determines ID i , PWi, and b i to compute HP i = h(PW i b i ). Then, it sends ID i and HP i via a secure channel. 2) CS generates a pseudo identity PID i for U i and
x is CS's secret key. 3) After receiving the smart card, U i computers D 3 = b i ⊕h(ID i PW i ) and stores D 3 into SC. The cloud server registers with the control server by executing the following steps. Fig. 3 demonstrates the cloud server registration phase of the enhanced protocol. 1) S j selects a random number r S and its identity SID j . It then sends SID j and r S to CS. Then, CS stores SID j and r S . CS generates a pseudo identity PSIDj for Sj. 2) CS sends (PSID j , C 1 ) to S j via a secure channel, where C 1 = h(PSID j x). 3) Upon receiving this message, S j stores it into its database.
B. AUTHENTICATION PHASE
When U i wants to access the service of some S j , CS can help to establish a session key. The detailed procedures are described as follows, and can also be found in Fig. 4 . 
2) Upon receipt of message M 1 , S j validates the timestamp T i first, and only if the timestamp is valid can the next calculation be performed. Then, S j selects a random N j , and computes B 5 , B 6 , B 7 : 
If the verification does not hold, S j terminates. Otherwise, S j authenticates CS. After the authentication, S j recovers
. To verify the session key again, S j generates a nonce b j , and then computes
Upon receiving M 4 , U i first checks the timestamp T * j . Then, U i computes:
Finally, S j checks MAC 3 =?h(SK j ||b j ). If this is true, the session key is SK i = SK j = SK c .
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE ENHANCED PROTOCOL
In this section, we use BAN logic [46] - [50] , ProVerif [51] , and informal security analysis to show the security of our enhanced protocol.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS THROUGH PROVERIF
Through user, cloud server, and control server registration and authentication process programming, we create an authentication protocol simulation. The whole process in ProVerif is: 1) A public channel ch is defined for login and authentication. A secure channel sch is used for registration of the users and cloud servers. SK i , SK j , and SK c are the session keys generated by U i , S j , and SC. Then, string connection operation, XOR operation, and hash function are defined. We made some queries to validate the security requirements. A process of function definition is shown in Fig. 5 . 2) A process of U i is shown in Fig. 6 . 3) A Process of S j is shown in Fig. 7 . 4) A Process of SC is shown in Fig. 8 . 5) In Fig. 9 , we state the protocol using UserAuthed() and UserStarted(), and the verification results are ''RESULT not attacker(SKi[]) is true'', ''RESULT not attacker(SKj[]) is true'', ''RESULT not attacker(SKc[]) is true'', and ''RESULT inj-event(UserAuthed) ==> inj-event(UserStarted) is true''.
Thus, we conclude that SK i , SK j , and SK c withstood the attacks and the enhanced protocol passed the verification by ProVerif.
B. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS USING BAN LOGIC
In this subsection, we will show that U i and S j share a key SK , which is calculated by the CS so that when the user wants to get the server's data, this key can be used to send a request message to the server. Note that the following notations and rules for BAN logic are referred to [46] - [50] .
1) GOALS
Our goals are defined as follows. 
2) IDEALIZE THE COMMUNICATION MESSAGES
A16 CS |≡ S j r S CS.
4) MAIN PROOFS USING BAN RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS
According to M1 and using the seeing rule, we get S1:
Using S1, we get S2:
Using A26, A27, we get S3: S j |≡ S j x U i . Using S2, S3, and the message-meaning (M-M) rule, we get S4:S j |≡ U i |∼ (N i , PID i ).
Using A28, S4, the freshness rule, and the nonce-verification (N-V) rule, we get S5:S j |≡ U i |≡ (N i , PID i ).
Applying this for each component, we get S6:S j |≡ U i |≡ N i .
Using A29, S6, and the jurisdiction rule, we get S7: S j |≡ N i .
According to the message M2 and using the seeing rule, we get S8:
Using the seeing rule for components we get S9:
Using A4, S9, and the M-M rule, we get S10: CS |≡ U i |∼ (N i , PID i ).
Using A5, S3, the freshness rule, and the N-V rule, we get S11: CS |≡ U i |≡ (N i , PID i ).
Using S11 and the belief rule, we get S12: CS |≡ U i |≡ (N i ). S13: CS |≡ U i |≡ (PID i ).
Using A7, S12, and the jurisdiction rule, we get S14: CS |≡ N i .
According to S8 and using the seeing rule, we get S15:
Using A5, S14, and the M-M rule, we get S16: CS |≡ U i |∼ ID i .
Using A11, S16, and the N-V rule, we get S17: CS |≡ U i |≡ ID i .
Using A9, S17, and the jurisdiction rule, we get S18: CS |≡ ID i .
Using A14, S14, S18, and the belief rule, we get S19: CS |≡ (ID i , N i , HP i ).
Because K i = h(N i ID i HP i ), we can get S20: CS |≡ k i .
According to message M3 and using the seeing rule, we get S21: CS {PSID j , B 5 : N j , PSID i x ; B 6 : SID j h(PSID j N j ) ; B 7 , T j }.
Using the seeing rule for components we get S22: CS { N j , PSID i x }.
Using A15, S22, and the message-meaning rule, we get S23: CS |≡ S j |∼ (N j , PSID j ).
Using A6, S23, the freshness rule, and the N-V rule, we get S24: CS |≡ S j |≡ (N j , PSID i ).
Using the belief rule for components we get S25: CS |≡ S j |≡ (N j ). S26: CS |≡ S j |≡ (PSID j ).
Using A8, S25, and the jurisdiction rule, we get S26: CS |≡ N j .
According to the S21 and using the seeing rule, we get S27: CS { SID j h(PSID j N j ) }.
Using S26, CS PSID j , and the M-M rule, we get S28: CS |≡ S j |∼ SID j .
Using A12, S28, and the N-V rule, we get S29: CS |≡ S j |≡ SID j .
Using A10, S29, and the jurisdiction rule, we get S30: CS |≡ SID j .
Using A16, S30, S26, and the belief rule, we get S31: CS |≡ (SID j , N j , r S ).
Because K j = h(N j SID j r S ), we can get S32: CS |≡ k j .
Using A3, S14, S20, S26, S32, and the belief rule, we get S33: CS |≡ U i SK ←→S.(G3) and Using A30, S33, and the session key (SK) rule, we get S34: CS |≡ U i |≡ U i SK ←→S j .(G6) Using A31, S33, and the SK rule, we obtain S35: CS |≡ S j |≡ U i SK ←→S j .(G7) According to message M4 and using the seeing rule, we get S36:
Using the seeing rule for components we get S37:
Using A18, S37, and the M-M rule, we get S38:
Using A1, S38, the freshness rule, and the N-V rule, we get S39:
Using the belief rule for components we get S40: U i |≡ CS |≡ k j .
Using A19, S40, and the N-V rule, we get S41: U i |≡ k j .
According to S36 and using the seeing rule, we get S42:
Using A1, A13, S14, and the M-M rule, we get S43:
Using A21, S43, and the N-V rule, we get S44: U i |≡ CS |≡ (N j ⊕ N c ).
Using A22, S44, and the jurisdiction rule, we get S45: U i |≡ (N j ⊕ N c ).
Using A1, A18, S41, S45, and the belief rule, we get S46:
Using A1, S47, and the SK rule, we get S48: U i |≡ S j |≡ U i SK ←→S j .(G4) According to message M5 and using the seeing rule, we get S49: S j {α : k i k j ; MAC 1 :
Using seeing rule for components we get S50: S j { B 7 , SID j , k i , N j , T c k j }. Using A23, S50, and the M-M rule, we get S51: S j |≡ CS |∼ (B 7 , SID j , k i , N j , T c ).
Using A2, S51, the freshness rule, and the N-V rule, we get S52: S j |≡ CS |≡ (B 7 , SID j , k i , N j , T c ).
Using the belief rule for components we get S53: S j |≡ CS |≡ k i .
Using A20, S53, and the N-V rule, we get S54: S j |≡ k i .
According to S49 and using the seeing rule, we get S55:
Using A2, A17, S32, and the M-M rule, we get S56: S j |≡ CS |∼ (N i ⊕ N c ).
Using A24, S56, and the N-V rule, we get S57: S j |≡ CS |≡ (N i ⊕ N c ).
Using A25, S57, and the jurisdiction rule, we get S58: S j |≡ (N i ⊕ N c ).
Using A2, A23, S54, S58, and the belief rule, we get S59: S j |≡ (N j , N i ⊕ N c , k i .k j ).
Using A2, S60, and the SK rule, we get S61:
PFS is a feature of key agreement protocol, and the feature is becoming increasingly important in the protocol. PFS requires that if the long-term key is revealed to A, A still cannot compute the SK between U i , S j , and CS, which is secure.
Assume that A wants to compute session key SK i = SK j = SK c , by SK = H (N j ⊕N c ⊕N i (k i k j )). The attacker starts computing the session key after obtaining the smart card, information about the public channel, and x.
First attacker can compute N i = B 2 ⊕H (PID i x) and N j = B 5 ⊕H (SID j x). Then A needs to compute another random number N c (N c = N j ⊕B 8 ⊕H (N i HP i ), N c = N i ⊕B 9 ⊕H (N j r S ) ). However, these two parameters HP i , r S are not available to A. That is, the attacker cannot compute SK . The modified protocol can provide PFS.
2) PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACKS (PIA)
Let assume there is a malicious U i who tries to convince CS that S j is willing to communicate with him. U i keeps two sets of {D 1 , PID i }, namely D 1 , PID i and D 1 , PID i , when running two logins with other S j . U i now prepares his message M 1 faithfully using the old method. Then, this malicious U i will create the message PSID j , B 5 , B 6 , B 7 as follows:
The malicious user sends the above-computed message along with M 1 to the CS. The CS computes k i = H (N i ID i HP i ) and k j = H (SID j N j r S ) for mutual authentication. However, r S is a secret value between the S and CS, and the user cannot get this value. There is no way to complete mutual authentication, and our proposed protocol can protect against malicious users.
3) STOLEN SMART CARD (SSC) ATTACKS
Assuming SC is stolen, the A can extract (PID i , A i , D 1 , D 3 , h(·)). However, we know that N i , N j , N c , k i , k j are needed to calculate the session key, where N i = B 2 ⊕h(PID i x), N * j = B 5 ⊕h(SID j x), k i = h(N * i ID * i HP i ), k j = h(SID j N j r S ). Therefore, the A cannot learn any information after obtaining SC, which means that the proposed protocol can resist SSC attacks.
4) OFF-LINE PASSWORD GUESSING (OPG) ATTACKS
Assume that A stole U i 's SC and wants to guess PW i by comparing the parameter A i = h(h(ID i ) ⊕ HP i ), HP i computed by HP i = h(PW i b i ). In other words, the attacker needs to guess the ID i , PW i , and b i together, which is impossible, so our protocol can resist OPK attacks. Similarly, the identity cannot be guessed.
5) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION (MA)
MA requires that entities across the entire network environment can authenticate each other as legitimate and secure. In our proposed protocol, the authentication values include {B 4 , B 7 , MAC 1 , MAC 2 }, and these values are calculated using the secret {x, HP i , r S }. These secrets are assigned during the registration phase. This scheme can provide MA. The establishment of the session key is the reason for the user to perform the authentication protocol. The successful establishment of the session key can ensure the security of the subsequent communication. After the mutual authentication is completed, the user computes the verification value {MAC 3 = h(SK i b j )} and sends this value to the server. If the verification MAC 3 =?h(SK j ||b j ) holds, it verifies that SK i = SK j . Hence, this protocol can complete MA and session key verification.
6) REPLAY ATTACKS
In our protocol, there are random numbers and timestamps in every transmitted message, where A cannot obtain the random number N i , N j , N c from the public channel. After each message is received, the timestamp T is validated. Subsequent calculations are performed only if the timestamp is valid. As a result, A cannot replay the messages without a valid timestamp and the random number, hence, our protocol can resist replay attack.
7) KNOWN SESSION-SPECIFIC TEMPORARY INFORMATION (KSSTI) ATTACKS
Assume that the temporary information N i is obtained by A. The session key is not only computed by random values; it also contains private information (HP i , r S ). There is no way for A to compute additional values, so this protocol can resist KSSTI attacks.
8) NO KEY CONTROL PROPERTY
Neither party can control the key negotiation process to compute SK separately, where SK i = SK j = SK c = h(N i ⊕N j ⊕N c (k i k j )). The details are as follows:
• N i , N j , and N c are random numbers independently selected by each entity.
• If U i does not know k j , which is contributed by S j , U i cannot compute SK i . Similarly, S j cannot compute SK j without the value k i from U i .
9) USER ANONYMITY
In our scheme, the pseudo-identity PID i is used instead of the original ID i . The pseudo-identities are updated after each communication. Additionally, all messages transmitted on a 
V. SECURITY PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS
This section is used to compare the security and performance of our protocol with related protocols, such as Wu et al. [44] , Amin et al. [45] , and Irshad et al. [43] . Due to the smaller number of actual uses, we did not calculate the registration phase when comparing.
A. SECURITY COMPARISONS Table 2 shows the comparisons of our research with some of the latest lightweight authentication schemes in terms of safety performance. Obviously, our protocol is superior to all protocols.
B. PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS
There are two operations in our scheme: hash function and XOR. Compared to the hash operation, the XOR operation cost is negligible. This paper ignores the XOR operation in its performance analysis. We use the symbols t h and t c to represent the time of the hash function and the time of the Chebyshev chaotic map, respectively. Through [44] , we know that the time cost of one hash function is 0.005174 ms, and the time cost of one Chebyshev chaotic map is 127.042 ms (t h ≈ 0.005174 ms, t c ≈ 127.042 ms). Table 3 depicts the results of the computational costs of the different protocols (Irshad et al. [43] , Amin et al. [45] , and Wu et al. [44] ). The comparison scheme is a three-party key agreement and identity authentication protocol, so the calculation cost of each party is listed. It can be clearly seen that the cost of Irshad et al.'s scheme is relatively high, and this scheme is not safe. Amin et al.'s scheme is the least expensive, but their solution is vulnerable to OPG attacks and KSSTI attacks, and it does not guarantee UA and PFS. Similarly, Wu et al.'s scheme has cost a few hash operations relative to our protocol, but their protocols have many security issues, such as PFS, malicious user attacks, and SSC attacks. Therefore, the security assessment in Table 2 indicates that the proposed protocol is not affected by the attacks and weaknesses suffered by earlier schemes. In Table 3 , our protocol is only a few t h and t xor more than Wu et al.'s protocol. In practice, these operations are trivial, and the solution has security problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first review the definition and importance of 5G and IoT. Then, we reviewed the authentication protocol of Wu et al. and proved that their protocol have some security issues, such as perfect forward secrecy and privileged-insider attacks. To address these security weaknesses, we propose an enhanced protocol based on M-S architecture in a 5G network environment. Through formal security analysis, we show that our protocol can resist such various attacks. Finally, the comparison of security and performance shows that the protocol improved in this paper has better performance and higher security.
